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The Free Press Clause enjoys less practical significance than almost any other 
constitutional provision.  While recognizing the structural and expressive importance 
of a free press, the U.S. Supreme Court does not explicitly recognize any right or 
protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause.  Recently in the Court’s 
Citizens United decision, Justices Stevens and Scalia reignited the thirty-year-
old debate over whether the Press Clause has any function separate from the 
Speech Clause. 
The primary roadblock to recognizing independent meaning in the Press Clause 
is the definitional problem—who or what is the “press” in the First Amendment?  
Others have attempted to define the press, but the ubiquitous instinct toward 
constitutional overprotection tends to invite overly broad definitions that include 
potentially everyone.  Proponents of these overinclusive definitions attempt to transfer 
our constitutionally overprotective approach from the Speech Clause to the Press 
Clause.  The net result has been, ironically, fewer constitutional press rights rather 
than more. 
This Article endeavors to break that cycle by arguing that the way to give 
long-overdue meaning to this important piece of constitutional text is to embrace 
press exceptionalism and a narrow definition of the press.  By adopting an overly 
protective approach to the Press Clause, we have been sucked into a constitutional 
feedback loop: An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap 
between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause.  
Awakening the Press Clause, therefore, requires embracing a definition of the press 
that is sufficiently narrow.  This Article furthermore submits that the definitional 
problem is manageable because line-drawing perfectionism is not required thanks 
to the fallback protections of the Speech Clause. 
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In the great preponderance of cases, a court has little difficulty 
knowing a journalist when it sees one.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Buried in the separate opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
183-page campaign finance case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion2 is a rarely seen tussle between two justices over one of the U.S. 
Constitution’s most overlooked mysteries—whether the Press Clause has 
independent significance.  Arguing in favor of free speech rights for corpora-
tions, Justice Scalia pointed out that most newspapers are corporations and 
yet the thought that newspapers “have free-speech rights only at the sufferance 
of Congress[ ] boggles the mind.”3  Thus, he analogized, if newspapers have 
broad First Amendment protections, so must corporations. 
But of course newspapers have broader First Amendment rights than 
corporations generally, Justice Stevens argued,4 pointing out that any other 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous 
Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 4. Id. at 951 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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conclusion would ignore an important piece of constitutional text—the Free 
Press Clause.5  Now it was Justice Scalia’s turn to be baffled: “It is passing 
strange to interpret the phrase ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press’ to mean, 
not everyone’s right to speak or publish, but rather everyone’s right to speak 
or the institutional press’s right to publish.”6  Justice Stevens, however, countered 
that the textual and historical evidence behind the constitutional provisions 
“suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be 
able to claim special First Amendment status.”7  He accused the majority of 
“tr[ying] to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, [when] the Free 
Press Clause provides a more natural textual home.”8 
The debate in Citizens United over how to interpret the Press Clause 
has not received much attention.9  But it should.  The justices were blowing 
the dust off of a constitutional question that the Court had not addressed in 
thirty years: Does the Press Clause have significance separate from the Speech 
Clause, or is it nothing more than “complementary to and a natural extension 
of Speech Clause liberty”10 with no functional role? 
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the Press.”11 Yet despite this textual 
mandate and Chief Justice John Marshall’s admonition that “[i]t cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,”12 
a majority of the Court13 has, in essence, dismissed the clause as a constitutional 
                                                                                                                            
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 928 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. at 951 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Seth Korman, Citizens United and the Press: Two Distinct Implications, 37 RUTGERS L. 
REC. 1, 2–3 (2010) (observing that “by affording all corporations the same rights as those granted the 
media, the decision at the same time seems to further enfeeble the Press Clause”); Eugene Volokh, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/lessened-
corporate-first-amendment-rights-and-media-corporations (arguing that the Press Clause protects 
“a technology” only).  This debate over the significance of the Press Clause is also arguably dicta.  See 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 976 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our 
colleagues have raised some interesting and difficult questions . . . about how to define what constitutes 
the press.  But that is not the case before us.”). 
 10. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); accord District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008); see also Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a 
Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 640 (1975) (“As nature 
abhors a vacuum, the law cannot abide a redundancy.  The presumption is strong that language used 
in a legal instrument, be it a constitution, a statute, or a contract, has meaning, else it would not 
have been employed.”). 
 13. While Justice Stevens’s reading of the clause puts him in the minority of the current 
Court, his opinion in Citizens United was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. 
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redundancy.  The Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value 
of the free press,14 but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or 
protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause.15  Because the freedoms 
to publish and to disseminate speech are also protected by the Speech Clause, 
the Press Clause has been left with nothing to do.  Members of the press thus 
enjoy the same freedoms of expression as any individual person, but nothing 
more.16  The rights to publish or to broadcast are the same as the right to speak, 
and what narrow protections for newsgathering the Court has recognized, such 
as limited rights of access to judicial proceedings, have been housed in a muddy 
combination of the freedoms of speech, assembly, and press and granted to 
everyone, not just the press.17  The result is exactly what Chief Justice Marshall 
warned against—a specific constitutional phrase that has been dismissed as 
“mere surplusage.”18 
Writing off the Press Clause as nothing more than the framers’ gentle 
reminder that we all have a right to publish our speech19 is problematic on 
several levels.  As a textual matter, it suggests that a pronouncement in the 
First Amendment, at most, restates only the obvious.  And as a practical 
matter, it is unsatisfying to have a Press Clause that is powerless to protect 
                                                                                                                            
 14. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role 
as a check on government abuse.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) 
(Black, J., concurring) (stating that the press plays an “essential role in our democracy”); Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“The Constitution specifically selected the press, which 
includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an 
important role in the discussion of public affairs.”). 
 15. See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“[A]s a 
matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in protecting the 
freedom of the press.”); C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing 
Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“The Court has never explicitly recognized that the Press 
Clause involves any significant content different from that provided to all individuals by the 
prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”); see also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, 
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 69–70 (2006) (explaining that while early press cases did rely explicitly on 
the Press Clause, over time the Court’s cases reveal an “abandonment of the Press Clause as a specific 
source of constitutional authority” as “the Court gave the press whatever rights it recognized under 
the Speech Clause”). 
 16. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (“Freedom of the press is a 
‘fundamental personal right’ which ‘is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.’” (quoting Lovell 
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938))); Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its 
First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 225. 
 17. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that in criminal trials, “media representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public”). 
 18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
 19. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing 
that the Speech Clause protects the right “to express ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses 
specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly” (footnote omitted)). 
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reporters who, as members of the press, endeavor to inform the public and to 
check the government.  The Court’s refusal to breathe life into the Press 
Clause has denied the press the attainment of constitutional rights of access to 
government information, meetings, and places.  Members of the press also have 
no constitutional safeguards from government subpoenas and search warrants 
demanding access to their sources,20 newsrooms,21 or work product.22  And if 
a reporter commits a minor tort such as a technical trespass,23 a minor 
deception,24 or a breach of loyalty,25—all common tools in undercover 
reporting—no judicial consideration is given to the fact that she was engaged 
in newsgathering. 
There is one formidable roadblock that stands in the way of recognizing the 
Press Clause’s independent meaning—the problem of how to define the “press.”  
Recognizing distinct rights and protections necessarily raises the question of who 
would (and who would not) receive them.26  To many jurists and scholars, the 
thought of identifying who constitutes the press reeks of government favoritism 
toward a privileged few and discrimination against other, less favored speakers.27  
Chief Justice Burger expressed this skepticism when he observed that creating a 
pecking order of communicators with some favored over others “is reminiscent 
of the abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England—a system the 
First Amendment was intended to ban from this country.”28  The myriad prob-
lems with determining who is or is not the press have been called “definitional 
monsters,”29 “difficult and vexing,”30 and “painful.”31 
                                                                                                                            
 20. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 21. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978). 
 24. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(arguing that a “fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status 
on a limited group is one of definition”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972) (“The 
administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and conceptual 
difficulties of a high order.”). 
 27. See, e.g., David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 102–03 (1975); 
Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 626–27 (1979). 
 28. First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 797–802 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Branzburg, 408 U.S. 
at 705 n.40. 
 29. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1411 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 30. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 31. Abrams, supra note 1, at 572. 
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Despite these obstacles, many have attempted to define the press.32  But in 
doing so, the natural urge is often toward a broad, overly inclusive definition that 
mirrors the Court’s expansive reading of the Speech Clause.  Our free speech 
jurisprudence is one of constitutional overprotection that seeks to embrace the 
so-called fringe speaker and speech that is of peripheral, or even no, value.33 
But while constitutional overprotection makes sense as an interpretive 
theory of the Speech Clause, it does not logically transfer to the Press Clause for 
two primary reasons.  First, a broad definition of the press, somewhat ironically, 
results in fewer press rights overall.  For the Press Clause to mean something 
independent of the Speech Clause, it necessarily cannot apply to everyone.  
If every individual is also a journalist or every message is also news, then there 
                                                                                                                            
 32. See, e.g., SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE 
PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 89 (2007) (defining press freedoms as 
“a personal right, which can be exercised by people who do not devote themselves professionally or 
exclusively to journalism”); DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE 
PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that anyone can produce the news); W. Lance 
Bennett, The Twilight of Mass Media News: Markets, Citizenship, Technology, and the Future of 
Journalism, in FREEING THE PRESSES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ACTION 111, 112 (Timothy E. 
Cook ed., 2005) (“Today, anyone with a computer or a mobile phone is a potential reporter and 
publisher.”); Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the 
Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 137, 137 (2003) (arguing 
that the definition should focus on “the process through which information that is useful to self-
governance is gathered and provided to the public”); Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law 
of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 829 (1999) (advocating a “purpose-oriented definition”); 
Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling With a Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 
103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 450–51 (1999) (suggesting that courts could define a journalist “in terms of one 
who provides information to inform the voting of wise decisions, a powerful goal of free speech often 
associated with philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn”); Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal Need 
Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 395, 425 (2006) (proposing 
the “journalistic process test,” a functional consideration of whether the person “adhere[s] to a code of 
journalist professionalism”); Diana Owen, “New Media” and Contemporary Interpretations of Freedom 
of the Press, in FREEING THE PRESSES, supra, at 139, 158 (predicting that the “already flimsy 
boundaries of the institutional press are likely to disintegrate” and be replaced by an “open press” 
model where the rights belong to individuals and not an institution); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen 
Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 520 (2007) (arguing that a qualified 
testimonial privilege “should apply to anyone disseminating information to the public who is called 
to testify in a judicial or administrative proceeding”); Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong 
Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979) 
(“[A]ll citizens exercising the press function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed by the 
‘institutional press,’ warrant [constitutional] protection.”); Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the 
Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1601 n.243 (2008) (favoring a definition of the press that 
includes “anyone who regularly gathers and disseminates information of public interest to the 
public”). 
 33. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971) (“To many, the immediate consequence 
of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.”). 
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is no need for two distinct clauses.  This is the prevailing view today.34  The 
justices’ understandable desire to avoid favoring an elite group35 has led them 
to allow the Speech Clause to swallow up the Press Clause.  In other words, 
the otherwise admirable and democratic objective to leave no one out of the 
press club creates a boomerang effect36 that results in no club at all.  But a 
limited press club is essential to unlocking the full potential of the Press Clause, 
as bestowing potential Press Clause rights such as certain investigative 
immunities to all members of the public would be impossible.  In our drive 
for constitutional overprotection, therefore, we have created constitutional 
underprotection.  Because the Press Clause lies dormant, rather than enjoying 
more constitutional rights, we have fewer. 
The second reason it is not essential to adopt an overly protective approach 
to the Press Clause is that it enjoys fallback protections secured by the Speech 
Clause.  These fallback protections lessen the impact of excluding some but not 
others as well as the costs of any definitional mistakes.  We embrace constitu-
tional overprotection when it comes to speech because the price of line-drawing 
errors is so high.  If a speaker or a message is placed outside the protections of 
the Speech Clause, his or her voice is lost entirely and the idea does not enter 
our public debate.37  This is a constitutional cost that the Court takes seriously,38 
and rightfully so. 
An interpretation of the Press Clause, however, that would allow 
journalists additional and unique protections, primarily with respect to newsga-
thering, does not present this risk.  All speakers, whether deemed members of 
                                                                                                                            
 34. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“We protect the press to ensure the vitality of First Amendment guarantees.  
This solicitude implies no endorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve lesser 
First Amendment protection.”). 
 35. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all 
persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it.  ‘ . . . the liberty of the press is no 
greater and no less . . .’ than the liberty of every citizen of the Republic.” (quoting Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
 36. See infra Part.III.B.2. 
 37. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Speech is often provocative and 
challenging.  It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it 
presses for acceptance of an idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless 
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger 
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 38. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (comparing content-based 
regulations on speech to content-neutral ones, which “pose a less substantial risk of excising certain 
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue”). 
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the press or not, retain their strong rights of expression, which include a right 
not to be subjected to government regulation based on the content of their 
speech.  While any definition of the press will necessarily be imperfect, these 
mistakes at the margins will not remove a speaker’s voice from our public debate 
as would a miscalculation in interpreting the Speech Clause.  Even a wrongly 
excluded speaker will be able to express himself and will be protected by the 
myriad speech safeguards such as protections against prior restraints and 
content-based discrimination.  Thus, the costs of error are much lower with the 
Press Clause, making constitutional overprotection not necessary. 
By adopting the same overly protective approach to the Press Clause that 
we embrace with the Speech Clause, we have been sucked into a constitu-
tional feedback loop: An overly broad definition of the press means virtually 
complete overlap between press and speech and thus no way to meaningfully 
interpret the Press Clause.  Awakening the Press Clause requires embracing a 
definition of the press that is sufficiently narrow.  Yet our overprotective instincts 
continually push us back toward a broad definition.  The temptation then 
returns to declare that everyone is the press, and the cycle continues. 
In this Article, I seek to break this cycle by arguing that we should not 
fear the idea of press exceptionalism.  We instead should recognize the unique 
role of the press—as compared to individual speakers—through a narrow, and 
thus useful, definition.  In doing so, we will be giving long overdue weight to this 
important constitutional text.  In addition to supporting a narrower definition 
of the press, I submit that the definitional problem itself is manageable, in 
part because line-drawing perfectionism is not required thanks to the fallback 
protections of the Speech Clause.  While I do not offer a definitive solution to 
the problem in this Article, I look to the unique functions of the press in our 
society and our democracy to offer some initial thoughts on which I will 
expand in a future article. 
My analysis unfolds in several parts.  Part I examines current interpre-
tations of the Speech and Press Clauses and how the Court has allowed the 
latter to become constitutionally meaningless.  Part II discusses the types of 
rights and protections an awakened Press Clause could offer.  Part III considers 
how to define the press, exploring how the constitutionally overprotective 
approach of our speech jurisprudence is unnecessary in the press context 
because of the boomerang effect and the differences in fallback protections.  A 
review of state and legislative experimentation with defining the press then 
establishes that the definitional problem is manageable.  I conclude by offering 
preliminary thoughts on how the Court might give the term “press,” as read 
Awakening the Press Clause 1033 
 
 
in the First Amendment, a narrow and meaningful definition based on func-
tional considerations. 
I. NO “MERE SURPLUSAGE”: RESCUING THE PRESS CLAUSE FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDUNDANCY 
What does the Press Clause mean, and does it differ from the Speech 
Clause?  On a purely textual basis, the answers to these questions seem clear—
it means something, and it is different.  Yet somehow, over time, this promising 
provision has devolved into nothing more than constitutional window dressing.  
The Court’s modern practice of reading the First Amendment with its judicial 
thumb over the Press Clause has led to wide acceptance that the Press Clause has 
become “redundant and thus irrelevant”39 and “about as useful as the vermiform 
appendix.”40  Yet this marginalization of the Press Clause is contrary to both the 
clear meaning of the words and to the common intuition that there does exist 
a press that performs a special role in our democracy and is deserving of constitu-
tional status outside the shadow of the Speech Clause. 
Any fair reading of the Constitution begins with the text, and the text of 
the First Amendment suggests that the Press Clause should be read separately 
from the Speech Clause.  The two rights, of course, are mentioned individually 
and even separated grammatically by a comma: “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”41  The framers have 
been accused of being “especially promiscuous” with their use of commas.42  But 
even accepting that the Constitution includes both “meaningful” and 
“superfluous” commas, “[i]t seems most charitable to begin with the presumption 
that commas were intended to be meaningful, so that the burden of proof should 
be on the person who wishes to ignore certain commas as superfluous.”43  In 
addition to the comma, the use of the disjunctive conjunction “or” denotes 
separateness implying that Congress could potentially violate one but not 
the other. 
Additionally, the Speech and Press Clauses are grouped together and 
separated from the other First Amendment liberties by semicolons.  This suggests 
                                                                                                                            
 39. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 
1257 (2005). 
 40. Paul Horwitz, “Or of the [Blog],” 11 NEXUS 45, 46 (2006). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 42. Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation 
and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 245 n.46 (1995). 
 43. Id. 
1034 58 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1025 (2011) 
 
that they were seen as sharing a commonality.  Yet the First Amendment’s 
prohibitions against laws “respecting the establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof”44 or the protections of “the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances”45 are also grouped together by semicolons.  The Court, however, 
does not read either of these pairings to be anything other than separate, if 
related, constitutional provisions each with its own independent signific-
ance.46  The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause both fall under 
the umbrella of the “freedom of religion,” yet they have never been viewed as 
redundant.47  So too with the Speech Clause and the Press Clause; they are 
logically read as related in nature but properly assigned different tasks. 
Plain meaning textualism asks, “[G]iven the ordinary meanings of words 
and accepted precepts of grammar and syntax, what does the provision signify 
to the reasonable person?”48  A reasonable person would clearly conclude that 
the words “freedom of speech” have a meaning that is significantly different 
from the words “freedom . . . of the press.”49 
One seemingly reasonable way to read the two clauses as having different 
meanings is to conclude that the Speech Clause and the Press Clause together 
provide that “individuals have the right to disseminate their views as well as 
to voice them.”50  This is the view of Justice Scalia in Citizens United51 and, 
indeed, is the prevailing view.52 
This alleged division of labor between the two phrases, however, is more a 
mirage than a distinct difference.  What makes this interpretation a difference 
                                                                                                                            
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815–16 (2010) (addressing an 
Establishment Clause claim but not a Free Exercise claim); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971, 2994–95 (2010) (discussing a Free Exercise Clause claim but not an Establishment Clause 
claim); Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 456, 457 (2010) (granting certiorari in a case involving a 
Petition Clause claim); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 409 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(observing that the right to peaceably assemble “has not generally been thought to protect the right 
peaceably to assemble only when the purpose of the assembly is to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances”). 
 47. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–33 (1962) (discussing the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses and stating that “[a]lthough these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they 
forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom”). 
 48. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38 (1994). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 50. Baker, supra note 15, at 956 (noting that “[a]ccording to this reading of Court decisions, 
the Press Clause is not meaningfully separate from the Speech Clause”). 
 51. 130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 52. See Baker, supra note 15, at 956 (calling this “the common view”). 
Awakening the Press Clause 1035 
 
 
without a distinction is that the Speech Clause has been interpreted to include 
far more rights than simply the right to speak.  The Court has repeatedly held 
that the freedom of speech also includes the freedom to have willing, and 
sometimes even unwilling,53 audience members receive the speech.54  The 
protection the Speech Clause provides, the Court has stated, is “to the com-
munication, to its source and to its recipients both.”55  Thus with the Speech 
Clause already protecting both the right to express a message and the right 
to have it received by listeners, viewers, or readers, there is no additional task 
for the Press Clause.  A Press Clause that protects only the right of individuals 
to disseminate their speech is redundant.  Some propose that the Press Clause 
protects a particular technology—the printing press.56  Again, however, this 
would suggest that the Speech Clause does not secure the rights to disseminate 
one’s speech via a particular method.  This is in conflict with the Court’s inter-
pretation of the Speech Clause.  Even Chief Justice Burger, a proponent of the 
view that the Speech Clause protects expression and the Press Clause protects 
dissemination, acknowledged that there is “no fundamental distinction 
between expression and dissemination.”57  Therefore, the claim that the Speech 
Clause protects speech while the Press Clause protects dissemination is an 
insufficient response to the textual evidence that the Press Clause and the 
Speech Clause are distinct. 
Despite this textual and structural evidence, the Supreme Court has never 
recognized any constitutional rights or protections belonging exclusively to the 
press58 that are distinct from the speech rights that all individuals (and even 
                                                                                                                            
 53. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 373 (1997) (stating that “in public 
debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 
adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 54. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
757 (1976) (stating that the freedom of speech “necessarily protects the right to receive” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the 
freedom of speech includes “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It 
is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); see 
also Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to 
Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1. 
 55. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756. 
 56. See Volokh, supra note 9 (arguing that the Press Clause protects the press only as “a 
technology,” not as “an industry”). 
 57. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978). 
 58. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 432 (“Nonconstitutional sources of 
special protection for the press are far more numerous.”). 
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corporations) enjoy59 and has only implicitly recognized differences between the 
two in select areas.60  This ongoing refusal to recognize any significance to the 
separateness of the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press has led 
the Court to use the phrases interchangeably, frequently combining them 
under the umbrella of the freedom of expression.61 
As constitutional liberties go, the Press Clause is a late bloomer, with the 
Court not deciding a single press case until 192562 and not applying the provi-
sion to the states until 1931.63  There was a brief period between the 1930s and 
the 1960s when the Court occasionally emphasized the Press Clause, although 
without explicitly relying on it as a separate right—a period that David 
Anderson has referred to as “the heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme 
Court.”64  It was not until the 1970s and 1980s, however, that the Court’s press 
jurisprudence ripened.  And it was during this more recent period that the Court 
decreed that there is no independent role for the clause.65 
While there are many cases that are often hailed as important press 
cases because the primary beneficiaries were journalists, the Court in these cases 
actually based its decisions on the Speech Clause or the freedom of expression 
and awarded rights or protections to everyone.  In the famous defamation case, 
New York Times v. Sullivan,66 for example, the benefactors of the favorable 
                                                                                                                            
 59. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“[N]ewsmen have no constitutional 
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.”); accord Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 
the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those 
enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities.”); Houchins v. KQED, 
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (“[T]he media have no special right of access to [a county jail] different 
from or greater than that accorded the public generally.”); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the 
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”). 
 60. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (stating that freedom 
of the press fosters “discussion of governmental affairs” and other public issues); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 864 
(Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the press has a “constitutionally established role”). 
 61. See Elisabeth Zoller, The United States Supreme Court and the Freedom of Expression, 84 
IND. L.J. 885, 886 (2009) (observing that “freedom of expression” is frequently used by the Court 
because “[f]reedom of speech and freedom of the press are so united in American culture today that, in 
practice, the Court makes almost no distinction between the two”). 
 62. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 63. Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 64. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 448. 
 65. There is, however, some argument that the Court has implicitly recognized some differences 
between the clauses during this modern period.  See Baker, supra note 15, at 958–59 (arguing that 
existing Court doctrine does recognize special treatment for the press). 
 66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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“actual malice” standard67 were the newspaper and four individual nonmedia 
defendants.68  The Court noted that the protective standard applied equally to 
the press and to the “citizen-critic.”69  The Court made it even clearer that 
media and nonmedia defendants receive the same constitutional protection 
in defamation cases in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.70  
Admittedly, the Court came close to recognizing a differing standard for the 
press in select cases such as Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,71 in which 
the Court ruled that defamation plaintiffs suing a “media defendant” must 
bear the burden of proving the falsity of the statement.72  Yet in a footnote, the 
Court stated that it was not deciding what the burden would be if the case 
involved a nonmedia defendant,73 and the Court in subsequent cases has 
refused to create different defamation standards for media and nonmedia defen-
dants.74  Likewise, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,75 the Court relied 
on the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly to conclude that the First 
Amendment guarantees the right of the public, not just of the press, to attend 
criminal trials.76  The Court’s reluctance to award the press any unique 
privileges has led it to adopt these broad holdings regardless of the desire or 
need of the public for the constitutional rights.  In Richmond Newspapers, for 
example, the Court admitted that “[t]he public was not seeking access to 
courtrooms . . . and could not be widely accommodated if it did.”77  Further, it 
reached this conclusion despite acknowledging that giving the press “special 
                                                                                                                            
 67. The “actual malice” standard requires that a plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit show that the 
defendant published the statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”  Id. at 279–80. 
 68. Id. at 256. 
 69. Id. at 282. 
 70. 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (applying the same defamation standards to media and 
nonmedia defendants). 
 71. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
 72. Id. at 775.  Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931), may also be seen as 
a press-only case because the Court spoke of the freedom of the press as including a right not to be 
subject to a prior restraint.  But that case has been interpreted subsequently as prohibiting prior 
restraints on all speakers.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010). 
 73. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 779 n.4. 
 74. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that the plurality did not distinguish between media and nonmedia defendants); id. (“[T]he 
First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others 
exercising their freedom of speech.  None of our cases affords such a distinction; to the contrary, the 
Court has rejected it at every turn.”); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001) 
(“[W]e draw no distinction between the media respondents and [the individual who disclosed the 
secretly recorded tape].”). 
 75. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 76. Id. at 577. 
 77. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, supra note 15, at 75. 
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seating and priority of entry” would “contribute to public understanding of the 
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal 
justice system.”78  Ultimately, the Court has made clear its view that “the press 
does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to 
enlighten,”79 and thus all protections belong to the public as well as the press. 
In the same vein, when the press has lost major constitutional cases, the 
decisive argument has been that the press must follow the same rules as 
everyone else.  The Court, for example, held that journalists enjoy no addi-
tional protections from government searches or subpoenas.  In Branzburg 
v. Hayes,80 a majority of the justices refused to give the reporters any immun-
ity from having to testify before a grand jury and reveal their confidential 
sources and information.  They did so out of a refusal to “interpre[t] the First 
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do 
not enjoy.”81  The Court also rejected an argument claiming that newspapers 
should have special immunity from the execution of search warrants for their 
newsrooms and files.82  Similarly, the Court denied the press the claimed rights 
to travel to Cuba for newsgathering purposes83 and to avoid liability under 
“generally applicable laws” even if they have “incidental effects on [the] abil-
ity to gather and report the news.”84 
To support his interpretation of the Press Clause as protecting only 
“the liberty to disseminate expression broadly,”85 Chief Justice Burger relied 
heavily on the historical viewpoint of constitutional scholar David Lange.86  
Lange contended that “the freedom of speech, or of the press” is a consti-
tutional redundancy because the two terms “were used quite interchangeably 
in the eighteenth century.”87  Lange argued that the freedom of the press 
evolved as an extension or amplifier of the freedom of speech.  He referenced 
English history, throughout which “the exercise of free expression obviously 
was confined by one’s capacity to disseminate one’s thoughts.”88  These limits 
on expression were loosened by the invention of the printing press, which 
                                                                                                                            
 78. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978). 
 80. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 81. Id. at 690. 
 82. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 83. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 84. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (holding that “generally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because [of] their enforcement against the press”). 
 85. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring). 
 86. See id. at 798. 
 87. Lange, supra note 27, at 88. 
 88. Id. at 93. 
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ensured that those other than the “rich and powerful” also had the tools to 
communicate effectively.89  The printing press sparked a revolution of political 
thought that led to sweeping regulations by the King.90  According to Lange, 
this “heritage of struggle” between the Crown and his English subjects gave free 
speech “new vitality by the introduction of the press, [which] colonials brought 
with them to the New World.”91  The two terms were thus interchangeable 
because “[f]ree speech could not exist in the fullest sense without freedom of 
the press; a free press, on the other hand, had no occasion to exist without 
freedom of speech.”92 
Lange’s interpretation, however, is only one of several prominent 
academic theories about the original intent behind the two clauses.93  First 
Amendment scholar David Anderson concluded that “[f]reedom of the 
press—not freedom of speech—was the primary concern of [the framers].”94  
Anderson relied on the events and documents of early American history to 
reach his conclusion,95 including pre-revolutionary declarations,96 state consti-
tutions,97 the Constitutional Convention,98 the state ratifying conventions,99 
the writing of the First Amendment in the First Congress, and the ratification 
                                                                                                                            
 89. Id. at 93–94. 
 90. Id. at 94–95. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 96. 
 93. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 272 (1985) (“When the framers of 
the First Amendment provided that Congress shall not abridge the freedom of the press they could 
only have meant to protect the press with which they were familiar and as it operated at the time.  
They constitutionally guaranteed the practice of freedom of the press.  They did not adopt its legal 
definition as found in Blackstone or in the views of libertarian theorists.  By freedom of the press 
the Framers meant a right to engage in rasping, corrosive, and offensive discussions on all topics of 
public interest.”). 
 94. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 533 (1983). 
 95. But see Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177, 
203, 214–15 (1984) (critiquing Anderson’s article as “confused” and arguing that “his use of 
historical evidence is irresponsible and a major weakness of his article”). 
 96. Anderson, supra note 94, at 463–64 (“The last right we shall mention, regards the 
freedom of the press.  The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, 
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of 
Government, in its ready communication of thoughts between subjects . . . whereby oppressive 
officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.”). 
 97. Id. at 464 (noting that nine of the eleven state constitutions adopted during the 
Revolutionary War included clauses protecting a free press). 
 98. Id. at 487 (stating that freedom of the press “was included in the bill of rights proposed at 
the constitutional convention; after that proposal was rejected, it was the only right proposed 
independently”). 
 99. Id. (stating that five of the seven proposed bills of rights at the ratifying conventions 
included provisions for freedom of the press). 
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of the First Amendment.100  Anderson did not claim that the framers had any 
“comprehensive theory of freedom of the press.”101  Rather, he argued that 
“[they] perceived, however dimly, naively, or incompletely, that freedom of 
the press was inextricably related to the new republican form of government 
and would have to be protected if their vision of government by the people was 
to succeed.”102  Anderson had a like-minded counterpart on the Supreme Court 
in Justice Stewart, who also advocated for a distinct interpretation of the Press 
Clause.  Justice Stewart concluded that the framers drafted the Press Clause as a 
structural provision that would allow the press to serve as the “fourth insti-
tution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official 
branches.”103  The inclusion of two separate rights, he contended, “is no consti-
tutional accident, but an acknowledgement of the critical role played by the 
press in American society.”104 
Virtually all who have studied the issue have conceded that the original 
meaning of the two clauses is not obvious.  Lange admitted that “the Framers 
have left us language in the first amendment . . . which, under almost any view 
one takes, is less than clear,”105 and Anderson acknowledged that the “Framers 
simply did not articulate what they meant by ‘freedom of the press.’”106  In their 
treatise on the freedom of speech, Rodney Smolla and Melville Nimmer 
summarized that “[h]istory casts little light on whether the Framers intended 
the Press Clause to have meaning palpably different than the Speech Clause.”107 
Interpreting the Press Clause as either a literal or a functional redun-
dancy is problematic.  A textual analysis strongly indicates that the Speech and 
Press Clauses protect different rights.  The simple explanation that one protects 
expression while the other safeguards dissemination, however, conflicts 
with the Court’s broad view of speech rights.  The historical evidence on the 
meaning of the phrases is, at best, conflicting.  Yet the Court appears to have 
gone out of its way to treat the press the same as the general public without 
                                                                                                                            
 100. Id. at 475–85. 
 101. Id. at 536. 
 102. Id. at 537. 
 103. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). 
 104. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); see 
also Abrams, supra note 1, at 579 (“Whatever other conclusions may be drawn—and disputes 
engaged in—from the history of the adoption of the press clause of the first amendment, one thing 
is clear: The press clause of the first amendment was no afterthought, no mere appendage to the 
speech clause.”). 
 105. Lange, supra note 27, at 88. 
 106. Anderson, supra note 94, at 486. 
 107. 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 22.4 (2010). 
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giving sufficient weight to the textual meaning of the two phrases and the 
functional difference between individual speakers and the press.  As an 
interpretive matter, this approach is unsettling; and, as a practical one, it robs 
us of a functioning Press Clause. 
II. WAKING THE SLEEPING GIANT: WHAT MIGHT  
THE PRESS CLAUSE DO? 
The debate over whether to interpret the Press Clause as independently 
significant also includes a discussion of pragmatic considerations.  Is there a 
need or a place for an awakened Press Clause?  How would it function?  What 
role might it play? 
It is undisputed that the Speech Clause broadly protects expression.  The 
freedom of speech provides powerful safeguards from prior restraints and 
places a “heavy burden of showing justification for imposition of such a 
restraint”108 on government officials who try to stop speech before it is spoken 
or published.  Any regulation on speech that is content based must survive 
strict scrutiny,109 and subject-matter and viewpoint discrimination are vir-
tually never tolerated.110  In the interest of providing “breathing space”111 and 
avoiding a chilling effect, the courts have interpreted the First Amendment 
as providing immunity to speakers from liability even when their speech 
causes harm to others such as defamation,112 privacy violations,113 inflictions of 
emotional distress,114 and even physical harm.115  Federal and state lawmakers 
must draft any regulations with the utmost precision to avoid the “strong medi-
cine” of the First Amendment’s vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.116  The 
                                                                                                                            
 108. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 109. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“[A]ny restriction 
based on the content of . . . speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”). 
 110. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“Premised on 
mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain 
subjects or viewpoints.”). 
 111. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 112. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 113. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 114. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 115. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 116. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). 
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government may not license or tax speech.117  The Court also has interpreted 
the types of expression that are protected broadly to include not just words 
that are spoken, published, or broadcast, but also nonverbal expression such as 
music, dance, art, and forms of silent communication.118  Similarly, the Court 
has held that the Speech Clause protects “expressive conduct” like flag or draft 
card burning and donations to political campaigns.119 
These expansive constitutional protections, it has been often repeated, 
are a reflection of our “profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”120  They 
further reflect our varied views of freedom of speech as an avenue to self-
fulfillment121 and as a vibrant marketplace of ideas.122 
With all of these protections for speech, it is worth asking whether there 
is any role left for an independent Press Clause.  The answer lies not with the 
protection of the news itself once it is published or broadcast, but rather with 
the process of obtaining it.  Once the press obtains information, its right to 
publish is indisputably strong.  But when the courts turn to the newsgathering 
process, the First Amendment seems to disappear.123 
The Court has recognized that the press informs the public124 and checks on 
“what the government is up to.”125  And it has acknowledged that 
“newsgathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”126 for “without 
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated.”127  Yet despite these recognitions of the important role that the press 
                                                                                                                            
 117. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (holding that “a [governmental] 
scheme conditioning expression on a licensing body’s prior approval of content presents peculiar 
dangers to constitutionally protected speech” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 118. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 119. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 120. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 121. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970). 
 122. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 123. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the “corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news”). 
 124. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667 (1990) (recognizing that 
“media corporations differ significantly from other corporations in that their resources are devoted to 
the collection of information and its dissemination to the public”). 
 125. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 
(1989); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press serves and was designed to 
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally 
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they 
were selected to serve.”). 
 126. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707. 
 127. Id. at 681. 
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plays in our democracy,128 the Court rarely has supported these statements 
through actual safeguards for the process of seeking or obtaining information.  It 
has furthermore never protected the rights of the press qua press to gather the 
news. 
When faced with constitutional challenges to the government’s 
impairment of access to information, the Court quickly becomes skeptical 
that the First Amendment is implicated129 and sees itself as navigating “trea-
cherous grounds for a far-reaching interpretation of the First Amendment.”130  
The Court fears creating an expansive—and unworkable—right of access, 
noting that “[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”131  Instead, the Court 
has drawn the constitutional line at publication and has held that when there 
is “no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material,” 
the First Amendment protections diminish sharply.132  Thus, the Court has 
concluded that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the 
unrestrained right to gather information.”133 
This approach to the First Amendment does a disservice to the impor-
tant role that constitutional protections for the newsgathering process could 
play in the public discourse.  It further overlooks the value of the Press Clause 
to allow appropriate (as opposed to “unrestrained”) rights for the press to 
gather information. 
A dynamic Press Clause could deliver a number of rights and protections.  
Whereas today journalists can be subpoenaed to testify and forced to reveal 
confidential sources134 or, if they refuse to cooperate, held in contempt135 and 
                                                                                                                            
 128. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (lauding the press’s “impressive 
record of service over several centuries” in “guard[ing] against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting 
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism”); Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (noting the press’s role in “exposing corruption among public 
officers and employees”). 
 129. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
 130. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 699. 
 131. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16–17. 
 132. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. 
 133. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17. 
 134. See Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for Book Chapter, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2008, at A17 (discussing New York Times reporter who was subpoenaed to reveal confidential 
sources); see also Shields and Subpoenas: The Reporter’s Privilege in Federal Courts, REPORTERS COMM. 
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_subpoenas.html#number (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2011). 
 135. Torsten Ove, Ex-Reporter Put in Tough Spot in Fight Over Sources, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, 
Mar. 16, 2008, at A1 (discussing former USA Today reporter being held in contempt for refusing to 
identify her confidential sources). 
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sometimes jailed,136 a Press Clause with bite could offer them reliable protection 
from prosecution in many cases.  Further, the ability to convey this constitutional 
guarantee to potential sources would unlock doors to future information.137  
The same is true when government officials attempt to seize reporters’ phone 
records or mail.138 
The fact that members of the press are engaged in newsgathering, 
moreover, is not a factor when it comes to prosecution for ordinary torts or 
other law violations.139  For example, journalists can be held liable for trespass 
onto property that is the scene of a crime or accident even when invited or 
accompanied by law enforcement.140  An undercover reporter who misrepre-
sents herself or her motivations by not revealing that she is investigating a news 
story can be held liable for fraud or breach of the duty of loyalty.141  If she is 
wearing a hidden microphone or camera, she might face charges for wiretapping 
or eavesdropping.142  Journalists also may be prohibited from entering places of 
                                                                                                                            
 136. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App’x 430 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(concerning a video blogger who spent more than seven months in jail for refusing to comply with 
a subpoena seeking his testimony and video footage); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 
F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concerning a former New York Times reporter who spent eighty-five days 
in jail for refusing to identify her confidential source); Blogger Released From Prison, REPORTERS 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://rcfp.org/news/2007/0404-con-blogge.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2011); Vanessa Leggett Released From Jail After 168 Days, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/news/releases/view.php?2002_01_04_vlreleas.txt (last visited Feb. 
22, 2011) (concerning a freelance author who was held in contempt and served 168 days in jail for 
refusing to turn over tapes of interviews she had conducted with witnesses who prosecutors believed 
had information relevant to a murder investigation). 
 137. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682 (considering reporters’ argument that they should have 
testimonial privileges “because if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or disclose 
other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in 
the future”). 
 138. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2006) (concerning a U.S. 
Attorney who seized the phone records of two New York Times reporters in order to learn the 
identities of their confidential sources); Mara H. Gottfried, Police Return Reporter’s Records, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 20, 2007, at B3 (reporting the police seizure of a television reporter’s cell phone 
records to uncover the identity of one of his sources). 
 139. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that reporters are not immune from fraud, breach of duty of loyalty, and trespass claims); United 
States v. Matthews, 11 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660–64 (D. Md. 1998) (rejecting an argument by a journalist 
that a federal statute prohibiting the receipt and transmission of child pornography should not apply to 
him because he was researching a story about the availability of child pornography on the internet). 
 140. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
 141. See, e.g., Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 512–16. 
 142. See, e.g., Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997); Dietmann v. Time, 
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 
1998) (noting that an intrusion of privacy committed as part of newsgathering might trigger some 
constitutional protections for the reporter). 
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public accommodation if they do so for the purpose of newsgathering rather 
than to avail themselves of the goods or services provided by the business.143  This 
is not to suggest that members of the press should be immune from laws; the 
question is whether the act of newsgathering on behalf of the public should be 
given any constitutional weight—currently, it receives none. 
In addition to serving as a shield for reporters as they go about the process 
of newsgathering, a revived Press Clause could work as a constitutional 
sword.  The press could claim constitutionally protected access rights to gov-
ernment information, places, and meetings.  While reporters, along with 
everyone else, can take advantage of the Freedom of Information Act144 and 
its many state counterparts,145 there currently is no constitutional right of 
access to government information, even when there is no state interest in the 
government refusing to disclose.146  Likewise, the Court has repeatedly rejected 
constitutional arguments in favor of access to government meetings147 and 
government-run places.148 
Statutory provisions allowing access to information and places do some of 
the work in protecting the newsgathering process.149  But members of the press 
(along with the public) enjoy these privileges only at the pleasure of the 
legislative branches.  These statutory rights, therefore, are in constant risk of 
being diminished or eliminated.  Statutory protections, moreover, can be 
inconsistent and vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, leading to uncertainty 
and, potentially, a chilling effect.  They frequently include numerous 
exemptions or do not cover some information or meetings.150  In some cases, 
moreover, such as those involving government-run places, there is no 
statutory protection.  A revitalized Press Clause could promote the same goals 
                                                                                                                            
 143. See Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978) 
(upholding a finding of liability against a television station after its news crew entered the property of 
a restaurant that had been cited for health code violations). 
 144. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 145. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, STATE OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE 
(2006), available at http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php (compiling the open records laws of all states). 
 146. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (“Neither the First Amendment nor 
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of 
information within the government’s control.”); Stewart, supra note 103, at 636 (“The Constitution 
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”). 
 147. See Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 148. See Houchins, 438 U.S. 1; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post 
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
 149. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 150. See, e.g., Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 832 F.2d at 1184–86 (dismissing on mootness grounds a 
district court order stating that, while the press and the public did not have a statutory right to cover 
a hearing by the Mine Safety and Health Administration, they did have a constitutional right to do so). 
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but without the inconsistencies or risks of curtailment inherent in the 
statutory rights. 
The Court’s fear of opening the floodgates with an unrestrained right of 
access is also unfounded.  Even the broad speech liberties that the Court has 
recognized are not absolute.  Similarly, press advocates have not sought 
complete protection of the newsgathering process.  In the reporter’s privilege 
case of Branzburg v. Hayes,151 for example, the journalists requested, and the 
dissenters argued in favor of, only a qualified testimonial privilege.152  Ironi-
cally, in ruling against the reporters, Chief Justice Burger turned their request 
for a conditional, as opposed to absolute, privilege against them.  He reasoned 
that “[i]f newsmen’s confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed 
to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the 
situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem.  For them 
it would appear that only an absolute privilege would suffice.”153 
The reporter’s privilege is one of the few instances in which journalists 
have sought to gain unique constitutional protections that would not apply 
to all speakers.154  Yet a prominent part of the backlash against adopting an inde-
pendent interpretation of the Press Clause both on and off the bench is the 
perception that doing so would necessitate giving the press “special rights.”155  
First Amendment scholar and press advocate Floyd Abrams has challenged 
framing the debate as “whether the press is entitled to ‘more’ first amendment 
protection than others,” instead of as whether “the press, however defined, [is] 
entitled to any different treatment because it is the ‘press.’”156 
It is important to emphasize that recognizing the independent signific-
ance of the Press Clause would result in a gain of constitutional protections 
only.  No one, whether a member of the press or not, would lose the expressive 
                                                                                                                            
 151. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 152. Id. at 680 (noting that the reporters assert they should not be forced to appear or testify 
before a grand jury “until and unless sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the reporter 
possesses information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information the 
reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that the need for the information is sufficiently 
compelling to override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure”). 
 153. Id. at 702. 
 154. The reporters in Branzburg argued “that to gather news it is often necessary to agree either 
not to identify the source of information published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both; 
that if the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so 
identified and other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred from 
furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by 
the First Amendment.”  Id. at 679–80. 
 155. See William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a “Preferred 
Position,” 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 768 (1977). 
 156. Abrams, supra note 1, at 570. 
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rights that are already protected.  There are no constitutional losers in this 
equation.  Rather, placing newsgathering within the protections of the First 
Amendment would allow the Court to acknowledge the important and distinct 
role of the press in informing the public and checking the government.  The 
Court has spoken of this role but has failed to support it and instead has let 
the Press Clause slumber. 
III. DEFINING THE PRESS 
Justice Stewart once observed that the press has the unique distinction 
of being “the only organized private business that is given explicit constitu-
tional protection.”157  The exceptional status that this specific textual recogni-
tion gives to the press should not be taken lightly or ignored.  As Justice Stevens 
recently pointed out, the inclusion of the Press Clause suggests that the First 
Amendment tolerates—indeed presumes—“some kinds of ‘identity’-based 
distinctions” among speakers at least as far as whether they are a member of 
the press.158  The problem, however, is figuring out how to make these constitu-
tional distinctions between who is and who is not the press.  Arriving at a 
definition is so challenging that it is even difficult to settle on the appropriate 
framing of the question: Do we identify the press based on who they are, what 
they are doing, how they go about it, or why they want to? 
To date, the Court has not attempted to answer these questions and has 
never decided whether any particular person or entity is a member of the press 
under the First Amendment.159  Instead, when faced with the issue, the Court 
has lamented the daunting task before it.  Writing in Branzburg v. Hayes,160 
for example, Chief Justice Burger claimed that the Court could not 
recognize a constitutional reporter’s privilege because the need to define who 
qualified for the privilege “would present practical and conceptual difficulties 
of a high order.”161  The undertaking is made all the more difficult, the Court 
                                                                                                                            
 157. Stewart, supra note 103, at 633. 
 158. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 952 n.57 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 159. The Court has, however, decided cases in which it has simply accepted without analysis 
that a party was a member of the press.  See Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, supra note 15, 
at 70 (observing that in early cases the Court “simply assumed that the litigants were press and did 
not consider how that identification might be made if it were not obvious”). 
 160. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 161. Id. at 703–04. 
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has noted, because constantly changing technology means that any 
definition it might propose “would likely be born an anachronism.”162 
While there is no doubt that defining the “press” is not an easy task, the 
difficulty of the challenge should not be an excuse to avoid the question 
altogether.  The Constitution demands that the Court take on a range of 
abstract and complicated issues, and numerous constitutional phrases function 
sufficiently despite a cloud of ambiguity.163  As Floyd Abrams has argued, “[I]t is 
simply unacceptable to say that because a word in the Constitution is dif-
ficult to define, it should be afforded no meaning at all.”164 
A. The Pull Toward an Overly Broad Definition 
When faced with the seemingly herculean task of defining the press, 
some have concluded that the difficulties are insurmountable;165 but there 
are others who have ventured fearlessly onto the field of battle.  The majority 
of past attempts, however, have ended with an overly broad definition that 
includes—or potentially could include—virtually everyone.166  The inevitable 
consequence of this push toward overinclusiveness is a crippling of the Press 
Clause.  I contend that in order for the Press Clause to have the independent 
weight it merits, the courts must give the term “press” a meaningfully narrow 
                                                                                                                            
 162. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 782 (1985). 
 163. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 580–81 (“A useful analogy is to that other central spoke of 
the first amendment: freedom of religion.  Consider the paradox.  It is plain that ‘we will not tolerate 
either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion.’  Yet, despite 
the evident risks of governmental decisionmaking in this excruciatingly sensitive area, we permit 
judicial definition of what is and is not a religion and which allegedly religious activities are and are 
not constitutionally protected.” (footnote omitted)). 
 164. Id. at 583; see also Werhan, supra note 32, at 1600 (“The problem of defining ‘the press’ 
is hardwired into the First Amendment’s limitation of government authority over a free press, and it 
cannot be avoided by ignoring the Press Clause.”). 
 165. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Sentelle, J., concurring) (“Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters 
employed by Time magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend that 
protection as well to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly newsletter to inform his 
neighbors, lodge brothers, co-religionists, or co-conspirators?  Perhaps more to the point today, does the 
privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at 
his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform whoever happens 
to browse his way?  If not, why not?  How could one draw a distinction consistent with the court’s 
vision of a broadly granted personal right?”); Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 435 
(suggesting that “the demise of the press as a legally preferred institution is quite possible and perhaps 
even probable”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need A Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
39, 47–48 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he idea of defining or ‘licensing’ the press in this manner is 
anathema to our constitutional traditions” although it could be done legislatively). 
 166. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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definition.  Why do we feel this pull toward an expansive definition?  And how 
can we resist this temptation in the future?  I turn now to these questions. 
1. Free Speech Overprotection 
The reason we so naturally gravitate toward an all-encompassing view of 
the press lies in our attitude about the Speech Clause and our conviction that 
First Amendment freedoms “are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely 
precious in our society.”167  With free speech, we have adopted an approach 
of constitutional overprotection under which we gather the maximum num-
ber of speakers and messages within the protective confines of the First 
Amendment.  The reasons for taking this position with the Speech Clause are 
valid: We fear that, in the absence of such protection, the government will 
engage in viewpoint-based or other types of discrimination, resulting in the 
complete loss of important ideas from our public debate.168 
For free speech advocates, the argument often focuses on protection of the 
“fringe,” suggesting that low-value or questionable speech is necessary to guar-
antee the security of core, high-value speech.169  As a group of media amici once 
explained to the Supreme Court, “[I]t is most often the speech at the fringes 
of American life that defines the freedoms for those at the center.”170  The news 
media in particular have embraced constitutional overprotection as a First 
Amendment theory.  Linda Greenhouse, the former New York Times Supreme 
Court reporter, explained that the press “sees itself as the embattled defender 
of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press” and 
seizes upon each perceived affront whether “serious or slight.”171 
                                                                                                                            
 167. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
 168. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (“Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword 
to prevent the[ ] erosion [of First Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States.  The door barring 
federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened 
only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.”). 
 169. See Patricia R. Stembridge, Note, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection for the Fringe, 
80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 924 (2000) (referring to this approach as “Fringe Protection Theory”). 
 170. Brief for ABC, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 
Paladin Enters., Inc. v. Rice, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998) (No. 97-1325) (listing amici curiae as ABC, Inc., 
The E.W. Scripps Company, Media General, Inc., Media Professional Insurance, Inc., National 
Association of Broadcasters, National Broadcasting Company, Inc., Newspaper Association of 
America, PriMedia, Inc., Radio-Television News Directors Association, The Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, Society of Professional Journalists, Thomas Jefferson Center for the 
Protection of Free Expression, Viacom Inc., and The Washington Post Company). 
 171. Linda Greenhouse, Books of the Times: Embattled Defender, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1981, at 
12.  But see JOHN LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 101 (1980) (arguing 
that during the pre–Civil War era the press did not actively defend First Amendment liberties). 
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Free speech overprotection has become a popular theory thanks in part to 
the fear of the slippery slope.  The concern with allowing regulation of fringe 
speakers is that it will lead quickly and seamlessly to censorship of high-value 
speakers.172  To prevent this, the belief is that we must construct a First 
Amendment fortress wherein no speech can be permissibly restricted no 
matter how questionable in value.173  Core, high-value speech is tucked safely 
inside the fortress walls and far from the speech-restricting barbarians at 
the gate. 
The Court’s relationship with constitutional overprotection of the First 
Amendment has been mixed.  While the Court has rejected free speech abso-
lutism,174 it has adopted a paradigm that is highly skeptical of any government 
regulation of speech based on its content175 (outside of a few narrowly defined 
categories).  If deemed to be content based, the regulation must be necessary 
to further a compelling state interest and must be the least restrictive regu-
lation on speech necessary to serve that interest.176  This approach, at least in 
theory, protects fringe speech with the same force as core speech and is in line 
with the Court’s repeated declarations that core free speech rights need 
breathing room177 before they are truly safe.  The Court, however, does give 
lesser protection to fringe speech through its practice of categorizing certain 
                                                                                                                            
 172. See Brief for ABC, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 170, at 15 (“No expression—
music, video, books, even newspaper articles—will be safe from civil liability.”). 
 173. Unless, most advocates concede, it squarely falls into one of the Court’s clearly delineated 
categories such as obscenity.  See, e.g., Brief for Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 
(2010) (No. 08-1448) (listing amici curiae as The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The 
American Society of News Editors, The First Amendment Project, The National Press Photographers 
Association, The Radio-Television Digital News Association, The Society of Professional Journalists, and 
Student Press Law Center) (arguing that “the unprotected categories of speech are extremely limited” 
and should not be expanded). 
 174. Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 807 (1993) (observing that 
“[u]nder current doctrine, and under any sensible system of free expression, speech that lies at the 
periphery of constitutional concern may be regulated on a lesser showing of harm than speech that 
lies at the core”). 
 175. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (noting that the Court has 
been “particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from 
governmentally imposed sanctions”). 
 176. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our precedents thus 
apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential 
burdens upon speech because of its content.”). 
 177. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
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low-value speech such as obscenity,178 commercial speech,179 and fighting 
words180 as deserving lesser or no First Amendment protection. 
Constitutional overprotection is an appealing approach for speech.  It 
ensures that the maximum amount of speech enters the public debate, avoids 
the evils of prior restraints, and most importantly, guarantees that neither the 
government nor juries are allowed to restrict speech simply because of a disa-
greement with the message or a dislike of the speaker.181  Indeed, the Court has 
shown great sympathy for these arguments in cases like Hustler Magazine, Inc. 
v. Falwell182 and Cohen v. California,183 and Justice Holmes famously extolled 
the virtues of being “eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression 
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death.”184 
The numerous and widely varied functions of the Speech Clause also 
support an approach of constitutional overprotection for speech.  Jurists and 
scholars have embraced the freedom of speech as a “good in itself”185 and “[t]he 
essence of civic courage.”186  The Speech Clause has been called “powerful 
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours”187 and is attributed with 
                                                                                                                            
 178. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (holding that obscenity is “utterly 
without redeeming social importance” and therefore “not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech or press”). 
 179. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) 
(holding that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression”). 
 180. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (arguing that “the broadcasting of 
patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities . . . surely lie at the 
periphery of First Amendment concern”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) 
(stating that there are certain categories of speech that may be constitutionally regulated, including 
“the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words”). 
 181. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“What the 
Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to 
decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”). 
 182. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  See id. at 50, 55 (concluding unanimously that the First Amendment 
protected an advertisement parody that the Court found to be “gross and repugnant”—and intended 
to inflict emotional injury on its subjects—in part because an alternative ruling “would allow a jury to 
impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a 
particular expression”). 
 183. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (admonishing that we should embrace what might seem to be a 
“trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege” as “not a sign of weakness 
but of strength”). 
 184. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  See also 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (stating that speech “cannot be restricted simply 
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt”).   
 185. EMERSON, supra note 121, at 6–9. 
 186. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in 
Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 691 (1988). 
 187. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
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serving a broad range of individual and societal values.  The constitutional 
protection of speech is credited with furthering our private and collective 
searches for the truth188 through the creation and continuing replenishment 
of the marketplace of ideas.189  The best way to assure this value, Judge Learned 
Hand explained, is by letting loose a “multitude of tongues.”190  Our freedom 
of speech, moreover, has been praised for fostering individual self-fulfillment, 
participation in government, an adaptable and stable community,191 and a 
more tolerant citizenry.192  To protect these valuable attributes, we have 
declared that we must be “particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expres-
sions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions.”193 
2. Past Attempts at Defining the Press 
It is thus through the lens of free speech overprotection that we turn to 
the Press Clause generally and to the problem of defining the press 
specifically.  We carry with us the impulse to include as many speakers as 
possible within the constitutional protections and these overprotective 
instincts make us recoil at the prospect of favoring some while excluding 
others.  We are similarly distrustful of any effort to bestow power on a gov-
ernment entity to make this decision.  Equally troubling is the blurriness and 
malleability of the dividing line between constitutional statuses, which 
leads us even further toward overinclusiveness.  It is therefore not surprising 
that most who have tried to tackle this problem have concluded that the 
definition of the press must include virtually everyone.194 
One of the Court’s biggest supporters of a separate view of the Press 
Clause, Justice Stewart, was an exception; he was comfortable with a narrow 
                                                                                                                            
 188. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19–55 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1989) (1859). 
 189. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (observing that “the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”). 
 190. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); see also Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (“[T]he widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”). 
 191. EMERSON, supra note 121, at 6–9. 
 192. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST 
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
 193. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988). 
 194. In a study of the press-definition legal debate, scholars Erik Ugland and Jennifer 
Henderson concluded that “the bias is toward an expansive definition of journalist.”  Erik Ugland & 
Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does It Matter? Disentangling the Legal and Ethical 
Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241, 243 (2007). 
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view of the press.  In his famous speech in support of additional press rights 
in 1974, Justice Stewart referred simply to the “organized press,” which he 
defined as “the daily newspapers and other established news media.”195  This 
definition, however, was quickly and strongly criticized as being too restric-
tive.  David Lange, for example, observed that it would exclude the occasional 
or alternative publisher.  Lange argued that exclusion of these types of publica-
tions is “perverse” because these are “two elements in the contemporary press 
which the Framers themselves would have recognized” because of their simi-
larities to the pamphleteer and the underground newspaper.196 
To avoid similar criticisms, any attempt to define the press must deal 
with the case of the romanticized “lonely pamphleteer” or, in today’s world, the 
“the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas.”197  Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the press could not be defined in part 
because of “the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the 
lonely pamphleteer . . . just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher.”198  
But the problem with adopting a definition that includes anyone with access 
to a laptop and a printer is that it effectively extinguishes all the airspace 
between the press and a general speaker. 
Indeed, defining the press has always been hard and keeps getting harder 
because of new technologies and the emergence of an information-based 
society.199  The “press,” for example, cannot simply mean all “written com-
munication,” because that definition is so limited that it excludes broadcasting 
and so broad that it includes written material that was never distributed to 
anyone.200  It similarly cannot be all “information providers” because that defi-
nition would include any person or business that trades or sells information 
regardless of its news value.201  In our information-based society, moreover, the 
                                                                                                                            
 195. Stewart, supra note 103, at 631 (reprinted from an address on Nov. 2, 1974, at the Yale 
Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation in New Haven, Connecticut). 
 196. Lange, supra note 27, at 106. 
 197. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also 
Horwitz, supra note 40, at 46 (“We might say that the rise of the blog represents the realization of the 
full promise of the ‘lonely pamphleteer.’”). 
 198. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Belloti, 435 
U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) 
(“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.  It necessarily embraces 
pamphlets and leaflets.”). 
 199. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905–06 (2010) (“With the 
advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media 
and others who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”). 
 200. See Nimmer, supra note 12, at 651–52. 
 201. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 443 (noting that “information providers” 
include “[f]inancial services, credit agencies, travel services, Internet service providers, telephone, cable, and 
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line between those who trade in information and those who are news providers 
is becoming even more indecipherable.202  David Anderson explained that 
“[i]t is impossible, or at least impractical, to extend press perquisites equally to all 
information providers, and it is difficult to distinguish the press from the rest 
because the press is ‘disappearing inside the larger world of communications.’”203 
Many scholars, therefore, have turned to a functional definition 
instead—in other words, it is not who you are that makes you a member of 
the press, but rather what you do.204  Linda Berger has suggested that the focus 
should be on the purpose of the proposed protections, which is to provide 
information to the public.  She explained that “[i]t may be that those who fall 
within a definition of journalist are those most likely to produce the desired 
information, but they are certainly not the only individuals who might do so.”205  
Tom Rosenstiel, director of the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence 
in Journalism, described the process of determining who is a member of the 
press: “You can’t say, ‘I’m a journalist, here’s my press pass.’  You have to say, 
‘I’m a journalist.  Here’s my work.’  Some of the people with press passes don’t 
make the cut.”206  Similarly, Scott Gant, former counsel for The New Republic, 
explained, “[J]ournalism is an endeavor, not a job title.”207  Thus, anyone with 
a laptop, an internet connection, and the desire to relay what they hear, see, 
or think can function as a journalist and deserves the same constitutional rights 
                                                                                                                            
satellite companies, public-relations counselors, mailing-list suppliers, directory publishers, health-
information services, weather services, business consultants, and gambling tout sheets”). 
 202. See Philip Meyer, Saving Journalism: How to Nurse the Good Stuff Until It Pays, COLUM. J. 
REV. Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 55, 55 (“Our once noble calling is increasingly difficult to distinguish from 
things that look like journalism but are primarily advertising, press agentry, or entertainment.”). 
 203. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 528 (quoting BILL KOVACH & TOM 
ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 11 (2001)). 
 204. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 32, at 829 (advocating a “purpose-oriented definition”); 
Sack, supra note 32, at 629 (stating that “all citizens exercising the press function, including, but not 
limited to, journalists employed by the ‘institutional press,’ warrant such protection”); see also Berger, 
supra note 32, at 1374 (proposing a functional definition that “focuses on the context within which 
the need for a privilege and the balance of costs is most clear”); Horwitz, supra note 40, at 52 (“The 
medium by which that journalism is disseminated to the public matters far less than the fact that an 
individual has deliberately gathered and disseminated newsworthy facts.”); Ugland & Henderson, 
supra note 194, at 247 (identifying the “egalitarian” definition of the press “in which all citizens are 
equally equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering watchdogs”).  But see Horwitz, supra 
note 40, at 53 (observing that “the functional approach may avoid one definitional problem—are 
blogs journalism?—only to replace it with other, equally difficult definitional questions: What is 
journalism, exactly?”). 
 205. Berger, supra note 32, at 1377. 
 206. Gina Barton, What Is a Journalist?, QUILL, May 2002, at 10, 11; see also id. (quoting Lucy 
Dalglish, head of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, as suggesting that a journalist is 
“someone who is collecting information with the purpose of disseminating it to the public”). 
 207. GANT, supra note 32, at 6. 
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and protections.  In his book titled We’re All Journalists Now, Gant calls for 
an end to any special treatment for the institutional press: 
We should no longer accept the routine extension of special perks and 
protections to professional journalists that are denied to others seeking to 
engage in essentially the same activities.  The First Amendment is for all 
of us—and not just as passive recipients of what the institutional press 
has to offer.208 
Gant’s claim that the news media enjoy “special perks” under existing law 
is highly questionable, at least as a constitutional matter.209  But his senti-
ment is well received by many who share an aversion to the perceived elitism 
inherent in making the press a select group.  Anderson described this view of 
the press—a view that he does not share—as “the tyranny of a self-appointed 
elite that depicts the world through its own filter, tries to tell people what they 
need to know, and bedevils their elected officials and their celebrities in the 
name of their right to know.”210 
This backlash and fear of elitism has led others to warn that defining the 
press at all could be detrimental to the press.  Journalism scholar Philip Meyer 
cautioned that “special rights for the press could easily lead to special respon-
sibilities” and create a “slippery slope leading first to the licensing of jour-
nalists and ultimately to censorship.”211  Indeed, while the press is frequently 
accused of seeking privileged rights for an elite few, the reality is quite the 
opposite.  When arguing as parties in lawsuits, press litigants have gone out of 
their way not to seek special rights—an approach that paradoxically might 
hurt their cause and result in fewer constitutional protections for the press.  
A recent study of Supreme Court briefs filed by media litigants found that 
journalists have “more consistently championed an ‘egalitarian’ conception 
of the press that recognizes the ability and right of all citizens to seek and disse-
minate news.”212  Rather than seeking special rights, this study concluded that 
media litigants “have been more diligent than the Court in avoiding ref-
erences and arguments that separate speech and press and that imply the need 
for unusual scrutiny of restraints media defendants.”213  This approach by press 
                                                                                                                            
 208. Id. at 5. 
 209. See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 245–47. 
 210. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 529; see also Mike Godwin, Who’s a 
Journalist?—II: Welcome the New Journalists on the Internet, 13 MEDIA STUD. J. 38, 38–39, 42 (1999) 
(advocating the end of special privileges for the established press). 
 211. Philip Meyer, What Defines a Journalist?, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2002, at 11A. 
 212. See Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme 
Court and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375, 380 (2009). 
 213. Id. 
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advocates has led to phenomenal successes in winning constitutional 
protections for the free dissemination of news, but these rights were secured 
almost entirely under the Speech Clause.214  When it comes to protections for 
the newsgathering process under the Press Clause, though, the news media’s 
win column is virtually empty.215 
In attempting to define the press, all roads lead to overprotection.  
Whether it is out of a democratic embrace of equality, a fear of government 
favoritism, or a repulsion to elitism, there is a shared instinct toward inclusion 
and a resistance to exclusion. 
B. Embracing a Narrow Definition: Why Less Is More 
Our urge to apply the same constitutional overprotection to the Press 
Clause that we apply to the Speech Clause comes from an admirable place.  
Including everyone within the definition of “press” appeals to our core demo-
cratic belief in equality as well as our faith in a vibrant marketplace of ideas.  The 
problem, however, is that the overprotective approach is not a good fit with 
the Press Clause, and the consequence of this mismatch has been a serious 
weakening, if not an elimination, of our constitutional press rights.  A closer 
analysis shows that constitutional overprotection is backfiring as a theory of 
press freedoms and needlessly so.  Unlike the Speech Clause, which may be 
damaged without an expansive approach, the Press Clause could flourish under 
a narrower regime without many of the risks inherent in a limited speech 
theory.  Thus, a narrower definition of the press can be both constitutionally 
acceptable and functionally superior. 
1. Boomerang Effect 
We need to resist the urge to overprotect press freedoms through an 
overly broad definition of the press for one primary reason—it results in a 
disappearance of press protections.  It does so by creating a feedback loop that 
ultimately erases any distinction between the Speech Clause and the Press 
Clause and thus eliminates the need for separate press rights.  Ironically, the 
more vigorously that judges, scholars, and press advocates fight for broadly held 
press rights, the less likely it is that these protections will materialize.  In his 
study of the definition of religion under the Free Exercise Clause, Philip 
                                                                                                                            
 214. See, e.g., supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text. 
 215. See, e.g., supra notes 134–148 and accompanying text. 
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Hamburger noted the same phenomenon, “that an enlarged definition of any 
right may invite limitations on the circumstances in which it is available . . .  
and its effects are apt to be felt with particular regret.”216  The goal of constitu-
tional overprotection has gone awry, and we are faced now with constitutional 
underprotection in the form of an incapacitated Press Clause. 
This boomerang effect works in three stages.  In the first stage, described 
above, we transfer our adoption of free speech overprotection to our interpreta-
tion of the Press Clause.217  This fuels our desire to create a definition of the press 
that equally protects speakers and messages on the periphery and those at the 
core.  Ultimately, we are forced to declare that virtually everyone is, or can be, 
a member of the press.  In the second stage, this overly broad definition is 
quickly revealed to be unworkable.  The complication is that, for the Press 
Clause and the Speech Clause to fill different roles, there needs to be a distinc-
tion between the press and everybody else.  As Abrams explained, “The broader 
the class included within the definition of press, the more attenuated the 
distinction between press and speech.”218  In other words, for the Press Clause 
to mean something, everyone cannot be a member of the press. 
In the third and final stage, the Press Clause disappears into the Speech 
Clause.  Because the Speech Clause already broadly protects expression and 
dissemination of expression,219 the Press Clause is not needed.  And the Court 
is reluctant to embrace what additional protections the clause could offer for 
newsgathering because it would require recognizing those rights for everyone.220  
Thus, the efforts to broaden the First Amendment’s press freedoms through 
an expansive definition have had the reverse effect and have left us with a 
Press Clause that is a constitutional redundancy. 
One potential approach that allows the Press Clause to function sepa-
rately from the Speech Clause is to interpret the Press Clause as offering protec-
tions only for information gathering.  This could create a distinct role for the 
Press Clause even if the freedom of the press applied to everyone.  There are, 
though, two problems with this approach.  The first is that the Court already 
recognizes some rights to obtain information as part of our general speech 
                                                                                                                            
 216. Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004). 
 217. See supra Part III.A. 
 218. Abrams, supra note 1, at 583. 
 219. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 220. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1977) (rejecting the contention 
“that media personnel are the best qualified persons for the task of discovering malfeasance in public 
institutions” and thus suggesting that everyone potentially could play this role). 
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rights.221  The second problem is a pragmatic consideration and another key part 
of the boomerang effect: It is highly impracticable to give these rights to 
everyone.  We cannot rationally exempt virtually everyone from some testi-
monial duties, protect them from otherwise justified searches, give them access 
to government proceedings, or forgive them certain law violations like fraud 
or trespass based simply on a cursory finding that they were attempting to 
gather information with the intention of conveying it to others.  It therefore 
appears that if judges must choose between granting these rights to everyone 
or no one, they will choose no one. 
An overly broad definition of the press, moreover, does not allow mem-
bers of the press—that is, those who have repeatedly committed time, resources 
and advanced skills—to take advantage of their abilities to earn reputational 
trust.222  It makes practical sense to give certain rights and privileges only to those 
who have demonstrated that they are more likely to use these protections 
responsibly and for the public good rather than to give similar rights to anyone 
with a computer.  Thus, the more exclusive and reputable the members of 
the press club are, it should follow that the courts will be more comfortable 
awarding them additional rights and protections under the First Amendment. 
2. Fallback Protections 
The second important way that constitutional overprotection is not as 
compatible with the Press Clause as it is with the Speech Clause is the existence 
of fallback protections.  A narrow definition of the press is not as constitutionally 
problematic as might first appear because all individuals and entities have exten-
sive communicative rights under the Speech Clause.  In other words, our broad 
free speech rights for everyone justify a narrow rights regime for the press. 
We have embraced an approach of free speech overprotection out of a 
desire to include the maximum number of voices and messages in our public 
debate.  The Supreme Court has declared that “[a]ll ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, 
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection 
                                                                                                                            
 221. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (“Free speech carries 
with it some freedom to listen.  In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment 
right to receive information and ideas.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 222. Horwitz, supra note 40, at 59 (“The established news media typically operate subject to a 
set of ethical and professional norms, made explicit in a host of ethical codes and, more importantly, 
absorbed by individual journalists in a deeply embedded sense of professional identity that shapes and 
constrains their actions.”). 
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of the guaranties” under the Speech Clause.223  This constitutional protection 
alleviates concerns that expressive works that are not part of the press, but are 
still valuable as art, fiction, science, history, or entertainment, remain protected 
under the Speech Clause.224  The same is true for individuals seeking to express 
themselves through their personal speech and even the occasional journa-
listic endeavor, regardless of whether they are deemed not to qualify as part 
of the press under a narrow definition.  At the same time, every person enjoys 
the strongest protection against prior restraints, lessening the concerns that 
a licensing system will be imposed.225 
This makes the Press Clause significantly different from the Speech 
Clause.  We strive to overprotect speech rights in part out of a fear of the 
“grave results”226 of making a mistake.  If a speaker is silenced or a message cen-
sored, the idea is removed completely from our public discourse.  This can 
lead to serious consequences, including the “standardization of ideas either 
by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.”227  But 
the potential costs when a speaker is excluded from the Press Clause are not 
as high.  Rather than being muzzled entirely, that speaker will still be free to 
express his or her message to a wide audience. 
By the same logic, the danger of creating a chilling effect, in which 
potential speakers refrain from engaging in what would have been consti-
tutionally protected speech out of a fear of prosecution, is far less with the Press 
Clause than it is with the Speech Clause.  While it is possible, indeed likely, 
that some potential newsgatherers might refrain from taking action out of the 
fear that they would not be deemed to be part of the press, they would simply 
be left in the position that everyone (including journalists) are in today.  They 
could pursue their information through different avenues228 and disseminate 
                                                                                                                            
 223. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 224. See Bezanson, supra note 32, at 855–56 (arguing that works of fiction, history, 
entertainment, and art are protected as speech, but not as press). 
 225. In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), the Court declared that “[t]he liberty 
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 226. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“Indeed, governments might soon seize 
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 227. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949). 
 228. This is, essentially, where the media stands today.  The Fourth Circuit, for example, 
explained that it thinks the media has ample alternative avenues for newsgathering.  See Food Lion, 
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 521 (4th Cir. 1999) (“We are convinced that the 
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their experiences, thoughts, and ideas broadly.  Moreover, depending on the 
definition of the press eventually adopted, they could endeavor to satisfy these 
criteria and further ensure their enhanced protection as a member of the press. 
These fallback protections lessen the impact of adopting a narrower defi-
nition of the press and provide protection against potential mistakes in line 
drawing.  As with any constitutional definition, some ambiguities are unavoida-
ble when trying to define the press as meaning something other than everyone 
or no one.  The Constitution and the Court do not demand perfection.  Even in 
cases involving speech regulations, the Court has held that some imprecision is 
“not fatal” and “that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements 
of due process.”229 
Nonetheless, we are rightfully concerned about the harms of wrongfully 
removing constitutionally valuable speech from the protection of the First 
Amendment.  We err on the side of overinclusiveness because the consequences 
of that mistake—complete stifling of the speaker—are so serious.  The Court 
has noted that a wrongfully gagged speaker has little opportunity to convince 
others of the error.  When discussing bans on obscenity, Justice Brennan 
explained that “one of the problems with erroneous determinations that prevent 
marginal material from ever reaching the public is that such material, which is 
by definition at the fringe of what is currently patently offensive to community 
standards, will never be able to exert an influence on those inherently evolv-
ing standards.”230  The same risk is not present with the Press Clause.  A speaker 
who is wrongfully deemed not to be part of the press can use his or her freedoms 
of speech to argue against that decision and ultimately to modify the definition. 
Adopting a broad definition of the press, as attractive as the notion might 
be, has failed to maximize the role of the press in promoting our democratic 
values.  The disappointing result of our attempts to overprotect with the Press 
Clause has been to destroy it.  Therefore, it is time to consider another approach 
to defining the press that will revive the Press Clause and allow it to attain its 
textual and functional potential. 
                                                                                                                            
media can do its important job effectively without resort to the commission of run-of-the-mill 
torts.”).  The Fourth Circuit’s approach, in my view, does not give sufficient weight to the 
independent value of the Press Clause. 
 229. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957). 
 230. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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C. A Workable Problem 
Accepting that a narrower, and thus more meaningful, definition of the 
press is desirable, the question remains whether it is attainable.  Is there a way 
to identify the press that would avoid the pitfalls of the overinclusive 
approach while still avoiding constitutional concerns such as governmental 
favoritism or content-based discrimination?  Unlike others who have concluded 
that the problems of this task are insurmountable, I contend that this is a 
workable problem.  While promulgating the ultimate definition is outside the 
scope of this Article, the Court is capable of crafting a usable, albeit imper-
fect, definition that would adequately avoid constitutional violations such 
as vagueness, overbreadth, or viewpoint discrimination.  I further agree with 
David Anderson that the definition need not arise overnight and may develop 
progressively over time.231 
The first step to a workable definition is to accept that an identifiable 
press exists and that it is more selective than the general public but not nec-
essarily limited to traditional news outlets.  While it certainly is true that many, 
and perhaps even all, people act from time to time in ways that are somewhat 
press-like, there are unquestionably people and entities who devote far more 
time, experience, expertise, and resources to being the press as opposed to being 
a regular participant in our public debate.  These journalists are repeat players 
who gather and disseminate news in a planned and consistent manner.232  Their 
conspicuous presence as news providers, moreover, subjects them to the accoun-
tability of readers, viewers, listeners, and frequently to professional or industry 
norms.  This is the group who, by informing the public and checking the gov-
ernment, most fulfills the functional purpose of the press and therefore benefits 
the public and our democracy.233 
Another commonality of the members of this press club is that they are 
the people and entities most likely to utilize the rights and privileges of a 
stronger, more robust reading of the Press Clause as imagined above in Part II.  
Reasonable minds can debate how to define this group, and there will always 
                                                                                                                            
 231. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wartime, supra note 15, at 52 (arguing “that the 
courts should work out the contours of the constitutional concept of ‘press’ gradually, on a case-by-
case basis, just as they do with other constitutional concepts such as ‘speech’ and ‘religion’”). 
 232. See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 253. 
 233. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 442 (arguing that the use of the word 
“press” in the First Amendment “implies the existence of something to which the collective singular can 
be properly applied—an institution, or at least a shared mission or common undertaking”). 
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be questions about the final membership list,234 but it does not change the 
basic fact that the group exists.  Identifying the press is hard and will require 
hard choices, but it is possible.  How do we know this?  Because it is done in 
this country every day and in every jurisdiction. 
1. Experimentation With Defining the Press 
What few legal privileges the press does enjoy are almost entirely noncons-
titutional.235  Thanks to federal and state legislation, the press receives press 
passes, press rooms, press galleries, press planes, press pools, and is often catered 
to by a press office and press secretary.236  The press further owes lawmakers for 
varied protections from newsroom searches and seizures,237 subpoenas,238 and 
securities regulations.239  The press also has been granted preferential tax 
policies,240 postal rates,241 and broadcasting licenses.242  While this is an impres-
sive list of benefits, they vary by jurisdiction and are enjoyed by the press only 
at the pleasure of the legislators, meaning that those who giveth can taketh 
away.  These legislatively granted privileges, therefore, do not resolve the issue 
                                                                                                                            
 234. Conversely, not all members of the “media” should necessarily be considered the “press” 
despite the common practice of using the two words interchangeably.  According to David Anderson: 
Most of the media are in the business of entertainment, engaged in activities that have 
little relation to the functions for which the law favors “the press.”  The entertainment media 
have no better claim than any other industry for special access to courtrooms or Congress, 
or protection for confidential sources, or protection from discriminatory taxation. 
Id.; see also Calvert, supra note 32, at 416 (observing that the line “between news and entertainment 
rapidly is fading in the world of infotainment”). 
 235. See, e.g., In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466, 472 n.9 (Mass. 1980) (noting that “the powerful 
rostrum of a newsroom or a broadcast studio may confer status of a type that is both real and laden 
with responsibility, but not, in [the Court’s] view, status of constitutional dimension”). 
 236. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 430 (“The press pass, the press 
gallery, the press room, the press office, the press secretary (or public-information officer), the press bus 
or plane, and the press pool are usually created by some form of law—statute, regulation, rule, or policy.”). 
 237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2001). 
 238. The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/item.php?pg=intro (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (noting 
that “31 states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes—shield laws—that give journalists 
some form of privilege against compelled production of confidential or unpublished information”). 
 239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(ll), 80b-3(a) (2001). 
 240. See Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 15, at 495–505 & nn.368–439 (discussing 
the Court’s treatment of differential tax policies for the press). 
 241. 39 C.F.R. pt. 3001, subpt. C, app. A, § 411.2 (1999). 
 242. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 Fed. Comm. L.J. 1, 12 
(1996) (“Two features of the new Act combine to grant virtually perpetual licenses to all radio and 
television stations.”). 
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of constitutional Press Clause rights.243  They do, however, highlight one 
important fact—defining the press can be done.244  A quick review of legisla-
tive treatment of the press reveals a number of ways that lawmakers have 
come up with to separate the press from everyone else.  Many states incorporate 
some combination of the following. 
a. Medium of Communication or News Affiliation 
Laws often grant rights to the press by looking to the medium of com-
munication.  That is, only individuals or organizations that communicate to 
the public via one of the listed media will qualify under these laws as members 
of the press. 
The most popular media listed in such laws include all or some combina-
tion of broadcast and cable television, journals, magazines, news agencies, 
newspapers, periodicals, press associations, radio, and wire services.245  These 
                                                                                                                            
 243. While the Supreme Court has never attempted to define the press as a constitutional 
matter, most lower federal courts have endorsed a test for determining who is eligible for a 
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Needs a Specific Test for Determining When Media Shield Laws Apply to Bloggers, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 747, 747–48 (2009); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005) (applying the state 
journalist’s privilege law to newspapers, radio broadcasting stations, or television stations); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to persons engaged in 
newspaper, radio, or television); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005) (applying the state reporter’s 
privilege to newspapers, periodicals, and radio stations); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2009) 
(extending the state reporter’s privilege to newspapers or periodicals, wire services, radio or television 
stations or networks, news or feature syndicates, or cable television); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 
(2010) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to newspapers, books, magazines, radio, or television 
broadcasts); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2006) (applying the state 
reporter’s privilege to those persons gathering news who have been employed by newspapers, magazines, 
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types of definitions are clearly aimed at identifying the more traditional news 
media.  A New Jersey court, for example, concluded that the state legislature 
crafted its shield law with the goal of “protecting entities generally viewed as 
part of the news gathering apparatus in the United States.”246 
One of the most obvious problems with this approach is that listing some 
affiliations suggests that no others qualify and thus raises the risk of wrongfully 
excluding a particular medium.  It might also create new constitutional issues 
of equal protection.247  In construing the Alabama shield law, for example, the 
Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language applying the statute “to newspa-
pers, radio broadcasting stations, or television stations” as not extending to 
magazines.248  A similar concern is that constantly changing technology and 
communication patterns could make the definition forever at risk of becom-
ing outdated.  The state shield laws, for example, often do not protect bloggers 
because they do not include the internet on the explicit list of shielded media.  
Indeed, it was not until 2007 that the first state, Washington, specifically applied 
its journalist’s privilege law to information disseminated over the internet.249 
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mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the public); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 26-1-902 (2009) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to newspapers, magazines, press 
associations, news agencies, news services, radio stations, television stations, or community antenna 
television services); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 218(2)(c) (McKinney 2005) (defining the news media as those 
who will be allowed to cover court proceedings in an audiovisual manner, including those associated 
with “television, radio, radio and television networks, news services, newspapers, magazines, trade 
papers, in-house publications, professional journals or any other news reporting or news gathering 
agency, the function of which is to inform the public, or some segment thereof”); see also CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (applying the state reporter’s privilege to “[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or 
other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or 
employed . . . [or] a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or employed 
by a radio or television station”). 
 246. In re Napp Techs., Inc., 768 A.2d 274, 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000); see also N.J. 
STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21 (West 1994) (providing protection to a “person engaged on, engaged in, 
connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of” newsgathering). 
 247. See, e.g., Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the plaintiff’s 
argument that denying camera access amounted to an Equal Protection Clause violation). 
 248. Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1335–43 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 249. See Bauer, supra note 245, at 747; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.68.010 (West 2009) 
(applying protections to any “newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, news agency, wire 
service, radio or television station or network, cable or satellite station or network, or audio or 
audiovisual production company, or any entity that is in the regular business of news gathering and 
disseminating news or information to the public by any means, including but not limited to, print, 
broadcast, photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic distribution”). 
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b. News-Related Activities 
Another legislative approach to defining the press is to describe news-
related activities such as gathering, writing, and disseminating the news.250  
These statutes extend protection to individuals and organizations “based 
on the newsgathering function, not the news gatherer’s media affiliation.”251 
A prime example can be found in Minnesota’s journalist shield law.  The 
statute extends its protections to any “person who is or has been directly 
engaged in gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information 
for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public.”252  
The federal Freedom of Information Act253 provides a similar broad, func-
tional definition of the press in the context of providing the press with 
reduced fees associated with document requests.  According to the Act, “‘rep-
resentative of the news media’ means any person or entity that gathers infor-
mation of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills 
to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to 
an audience.”254  Some of these activity-based definitions focus on the intent of 
the party.  A federal court interpreting New York’s shield law concluded that 
                                                                                                                            
 250. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4701 (LexisNexis 2001) (including within its press definition “any 
printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the 
public”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2006) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-
146 (2007) (covering any person who is “engaged in procuring, gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating 
news or other information to the public”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.129(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 
2010) (defining journalist as a person connected with any news medium, including newspapers, 
magazines, press associations, news agencies, wire services, radio or television stations, or “a similar 
medium, for the purpose of gathering, processing, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating 
information for the general public”); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510 (2009) (including those engaged in 
any medium of communication to the public); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000) (“A person 
engaged in gathering information for publication or broadcast connected with or employed by the 
news media or press, or who is independently engaged in gathering information for publication or 
broadcast, shall not be required . . . to disclose . . . any information or the source of any information 
procured for publication or broadcast.”); see also People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643, 654 (Ct. App. 
2005) (interpreting California law and finding that “to qualify for the shield law protection, the 
newsperson must show that he is one of the types of persons enumerated in the law, that the information 
was obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to 
the public, and that the information has not been disseminated to the public by the person from 
whom disclosure is sought” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 251. Bauer, supra note 245, at 757 n.65.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767A.6 (West 
2000) (“A reporter or other person who is involved in gathering or preparation of news for broadcast 
or publication.”). 
 252. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West 2010); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2009) 
(shielding those “engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, photographing, 
recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news medium”). 
 253. 5 U.S.C § 552 (2006). 
 254. 5 U.S.C. § 552(4)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. 2009). 
1066 58 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1025 (2011) 
 
would-be journalists must show that they engaged in the information 
gathering “with the intent of using the information collected, at least in part, 
to publish a report that would be widely and publicly circulated.”255 
This approach avoids some of the pitfalls of the definition-by-affiliation 
approach discussed above.  Most notably, it gives room for technology to change 
by focusing on the core activity at issue.  This approach is also more egalitarian 
because it treats “the occasional pamphleteer precisely the same as the regu-
larly employed journalist”256 and leaves room to include internet newspersons.257  
At the same time, though, the broad definition raises the risk of redundancy 
between the Press Clause and the Speech Clause.258 
c. Circulation or Regularity of Publication 
Still other statutes provide definitions of the press that demand a minimum 
circulation or regularity of publication.  One example of a statute with these 
requirements is Illinois’s journalist shield law, which defines “news medium” 
as “any newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals . . . and 
having a general circulation.”259  The Indiana reporter’s privilege statute 
contains similar requirements in that it covers persons connected with or 
employed by “a newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals and 
having a general circulation.”260 
                                                                                                                            
 255. Schiller v. New York, 245 F.R.D. 112, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Likely the only other 
reported case that interprets the New York shield law’s definitions clause is from the Superior Court 
of New Jersey.  Trump v. O’Brien, 958 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2008) (holding that an 
author who gathered news sources for publication in his book qualified as a professional journalist 
under New York law). 
 256. Abrams, supra note 1, at 581. 
 257. Bauer, supra note 245, at 747.  See, e.g., O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 
106 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that bloggers are within protected class of California shield law). 
 258. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 259. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 8-902 (West 2003).  In a case seeking to define “news 
media” for the purposes of a public disclosure bar to claims under the Illinois Whistleblower Act, an 
Illinois appellate court noted that the state legislature had not defined “news media” for purposes of 
the Whistleblower Act before borrowing and applying the legislature’s statutory definition of “news 
media” in the state’s reporter’s privilege law.  State ex rel. Beeler v. Target Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1096, 
1104–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 260. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 2008); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5492 
(West 2000) (“No person engaged in, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circu- 
lation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general 
circulation.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 (1997) (defining “newspaper” and “periodical” to mean only 
publications issued at regular intervals and with paid circulation and explicitly stating that the 
definition applies to those gathering or presenting news for any accredited newspaper). 
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Similarly, the federal code section regulating prison inmate mail cor-
respondence allows inmates to write to news media and representatives of 
the media to initiate correspondence.261  That regulation explicitly applies only 
to newspapers circulating among the general public and publishing news of 
general character or interest; news magazines with national circulation sold 
by newsstands and mail subscription to the general public; national or 
international news services; and radio or television programs with the pri-
mary purpose of reporting the news and holding FCC licenses.262 
This approach to defining the press exemplifies an attempt to distin-
guish between repeat journalists with an established audience and the occa-
sional public commentator.  The idea behind these statutory definitions is that 
not just anyone should be able to claim status as a journalist and receive legal 
rights or protections.  A benefit of this approach is that someone who is not asso-
ciated with an established media outlet—the bedroom blogger, for example—
may gain recognition as a member of the press over time if she publishes 
regularly and builds a consistent audience. 
d. Wage Earning or Livelihood 
Finally, some legislation requires that to receive protection as a mem-
ber of the press, the individual must be employed as a professional journalist 
or earn his or her livelihood in the capacity of a reporter. 
Delaware’s reporter shield law, for example provides protections in 
cases in which the individual is “earning his or her principal livelihood” from 
newsgathering.263  In the alternative, if a person does not earn his or her prin-
cipal livelihood from journalism, the Delaware scheme offers protection to 
individuals who worked as a reporter for at least twenty hours in the three 
weeks prior or four of the previous eight weeks.264  Along the same lines, other 
statutes extend legal protections or rights only to “professional journalists.”  
For example, Florida’s journalist’s privilege law only addresses “professional 
[j]ournalists,” defined as persons who regularly engage in newsgathering 
activity for gain or for livelihood while working as salaried employees or 
independent contractors.265 
                                                                                                                            
 261. 28 C.F.R. § 540.2 (2009). 
 262. Id. 
 263. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320 (1999). 
 264. Id. 
 265. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999); see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h 
(McKinney 1999) (extending coverage to any “professional journalist,” which it defines as a person 
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A provision in the Code of Federal Regulations providing an exception 
to prohibited travel-related transactions in Iraq for news-reporting activities 
sets forth similar “professionalism” requirements.266  According to the regula-
tion, transactions in Iraq by “persons regularly employed in journalistic activity 
by recognized newsgathering organizations” are not prohibited.267 
This is yet another attempt to separate the repeat journalist from the occa-
sional contributor to the public debate.  Unlike the circulation or regularity of 
publication criteria, however, the wage-earning or livelihood requirement 
does not allow an amateur or unaffiliated would-be journalist to earn a press 
credential simply by being a consistent publisher and building an audience. 
2. The Unique Functions of the Press qua Press 
There is no dispute that the search for a workable definition of the press is 
filled with minefields.  But unless some distinguishing criteria are adopted 
and some expressive activity excluded, our press rights will be nothing but 
a reiteration of our speech rights.  Accepting that limiting factors must be 
chosen, however, raises the risk that certain speakers and messages will 
be excluded not for constitutionally significant reasons, but because they are 
disfavored by a governmental entity or the public generally.  The challenge 
is to find a definition that is narrow enough to be distinct yet broad enough to 
be fair.  The opposite approach—the one the Supreme Court is now 
taking—of not defining the press at all is unacceptable because it eliminates 
entirely the First Amendment’s separate press freedoms. 
My goal with this Article has been to expose the problems with the 
current approach, to highlight the net loss of constitutional freedoms it has 
engendered, and to urge an embrace of press exceptionalism recognized 
through a narrow definition of the press.  I make no pretense of settling the defi-
nitional question, and I will address this question more fully in a future article.  
But as an offering of preliminary thoughts, I suggest that the most promising 
avenue is to focus on the unique functions of the press qua press. 
Because the inherent value of the Press Clause arises out of its separate 
role from the Speech Clause, I propose that this is where the focus belongs.  
Thus, by examining those functions that a free press fulfills in our 
democracy that are different from the values served by our speech freedoms, 
                                                                                                                            
“who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, 
taping or photographing of news intended for” various news media). 
 266. 31 C.F.R. § 575.207 (2008). 
 267. Id. § 575.416. 
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we can close in on a meaningful definition.  Defining the press through the 
lens of its unique functions has the primary benefit of ensuring that we 
avoid the redundancy problem.  It does so by necessarily excluding a view of 
the Press Clause as guaranteeing that “all individuals have a right to 
disseminate their viewpoints for general consideration.”268  Because the 
Speech Clause already protects the individual right to disseminate 
messages, this definition would not address any of the unique functions of 
the Press Clause. 
The unique-functions approach further avoids the troublesome dichot-
omy of having to choose between a definition that is too elitist and one 
that is too inclusive.  Many scholars have tended toward a broad definition 
of the press in which everyone is or easily can be a journalist.269  They elect 
an overinclusive approach in part to avoid the criticism that a narrower 
definition establishes an “elite, protected class.”270  In addition to creating the 
redundancy problem, this dichotomy does not allow us to recognize and 
protect those who have specialized abilities and resources for newsgathering 
as well as a proven commitment to news dissemination.  Thus, the “genuine 
difficulty” in crafting a definition, Floyd Abrams has argued, has “deter[red] us 
from affording protection to those who are plainly entitled to it.”271 
Through a proper analysis of the unique functions of the press qua press, 
the Court can identify characteristics that avoid the disconcerting confor-
mity and favoritism of the elite while still allowing us to recognize and benefit 
from the press’s knowledge, skills, and dedication.  A unique-functions approach 
allows the Court to embrace all the advantages of the egalitarian definition 
by crafting a definition of the press in which not everyone is a member, but 
everyone has the equal potential of becoming a member.  
So what are the unique functions of the press?  I suggest that the press fills 
two primary roles that go beyond the values served by our basic free speech 
rights.  The first is that the press gathers and conveys information to the public 
about newsworthy matters; and the second is that the press serves as a check 
                                                                                                                            
 268. See Timothy E. Cook, Freeing the Presses: An Introductory Essay, in FREEING THE PRESSES, 
supra note 32, at 1, 8. 
 269. See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 247 (identifying the “egalitarian 
model . . . in which all citizens are equally equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering 
watchdogs”). 
 270. Calvert, supra note 32, at 413 (1999); Ugland & Henderson, supra note 194, at 246–47 
(identifying the “expert model, in which journalists are conceived of as a uniquely qualified and 
clearly identifiable collection of professionals who serve as agents of the public in the procurement 
and dissemination of news”). 
 271. Abrams, supra note 1, at 580. 
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on the government by conveying information to the voters about “what [their] 
Government is up to.”272  Both of these functions have been recognized by the 
Court yet have never been given significance in terms of constitutional protec-
tions.  A definitional analysis thus can build on these functions as a method 
of pinpointing the people or entities that most fulfill these roles.  We can look, 
moreover, to legislative experimentation with defining the press as a starting 
point by asking which, if any, of these definitions best captures the special role 
of the press.  Under any definitional scheme, of course, the courts must conti-
nually patrol for signs of content-based or viewpoint-based discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Few constitutional provisions have been given as little practical weight 
as the Free Press Clause.  Despite an explicit textual directive, the Press Clause 
has been interpreted to mean nothing more than the freedom to publish or 
disseminate individual speech—a right that is of dubious value considering that 
the Speech Clause protects these same freedoms.  The result is a constitutional 
regime in which the Press Clause has been relegated to a mere redundancy. 
Even those who interpret the constitutional text and history as giving 
the clause more significance, however, have considered the definitional prob-
lem an insurmountable roadblock.  The ubiquitous acceptance today of the 
need for a constitutionally overprotective approach to the Press Clause—as is 
the practice with the Speech Clause—makes it impossible to define the press in 
a meaningful way.  To rouse the Press Clause from its slumber, it is necessary 
to reject an overprotective approach and to embrace a narrow definition that 
separates a member of the press from an occasional public commentator.  The 
constitutional fallback protections, meanwhile, ensure that the marketplace 
of ideas is vibrant.  The Press Clause needs a distinct definition to truly fulfill 
its unique functions in our society and our democracy. 
The Constitution gives the press explicit protection.  It does so because 
the press has always played an exceptional and important role in our society 
and our democracy.  It is up to us to recognize, honor, and protect that unique 
role.  We should no longer fear press exceptionalism.  The press is not everyone; 
everyone is not the press. 
                                                                                                                            
 272. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 
(1989); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role as a 
check on government abuse.”). 
